Das Verhältnis von Ethik und Recht. Für eine umfassende Interpretation der Moral Kants

It is difficult to find an unambiguous interpretation of the
relationship between Kant’s Rechtslehre and Tugendlehre. This also
seems apparent from the failure, among Kantian scholars, to
identify such a common perspective. For this reason, my thesis
argues that it is not possible to understand the relation between
ethics and the right in Kant from a unique point of view, but only
by adopting different perspectives will it be possible to analyze
the numerous facets of this relationship and understand them. I
have singled out three perspectives in my analysis: the metaethical
and metajuridical perspective, which refers to Kantian moral
thinking prior to the distinction between ethics and the right; the
perspective of freedom, that is, the perspective of the different
spheres in which human freedom fulfils itself; and finally, the
perspective of the totality, that is, the communitarian dimension
in which ethics and the right can realise themselves and their
proper ends. On the one hand, by adopting these perspectives my
analysis makes it possible to interpret the relation between ethics
and right for Kant in terms of a co-implication in the difference.
On the other hand, it provides a possibility to generally
re-interpret Kantian morality, which shows itself to be permeated
with a content of value: the value of humanity in every person. So
the ground of Kantian morality is not duty per se, but the
unconditional duty for respecting the absolute value of humanity.
From this point of view, Kantian ethics and the right are defined
as an ethics and a right for the respect of the person.